Memorandum on the foreign exchange surcharge system by Despres, Emile
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 
i'Jo. 44 
Memorandum on the Foreign i-xchange Surcharge 
System 
By 
Professor Emile Despres 
INSTITUTE 
OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
STUDiES 
LIBRARY 
PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
O L D S I N D A S S E M B L Y B U I L D I N G 
B U N D E R R O A D , K A R A C H I 
P A K I S T A N 
No. 44 
Memorandum on the Foreign Exchange Surcharge 
System 
By 
Professor Emile Despres 
The Research Reports of the Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics are circulated to inform interested Persons with regard to research progress at the Institute, hese reports may be freely circulated but they are not to 
be quoted without the permission of the author. Work on 
this manuscript is still in progress; comments are invited 
to improve the final version. 
November 1965 
PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMEMT ECONOMICS 
OLD SIND ASSEMBLY BUILDING 
BUNDER ROAD, KARACHI-1 
( P a k i s t a n ) 
I fully agree with the view put forward in Clair Wilcox's 
note of 15 November, entitled "Overplanning?". Moreover, the ten-
dency pointed out in this note to become too detailed and specific 
in drawing up a private investment plan seems to me one aspect of 
a more deepseated difficulty. There appears to be an assump-
tion that Government must plan and regulate all aspects of econo-
mic life in detail even though the regulations are applied without 
coordination or clear objectives and without adequate data or 
efficient administrative apparatus. Many factors are responsible 
for this, including a rather paternalistic view of the role of 
government. 
There are many portions of the.private sector, such as 
agriculture and cottage industry, in which positive governmental, 
stimulation is essential. There are others, such as luxury con-
struction, in which more restrictive governmental controls would 
be highly desirable. But there is a broad area which could best be 
left to semi-automatic, decentralized regulation through the 
mechanism of the market. In this area the apparatus of direct 
controls, including import licenses, licensing of new firms, ca-
pital issues authorizations"and many others, is a major impediment 
to economic efficiency and growth. 
I have used the term "semi-automatic" in the previous para-
graph because the government's role in spheres which are left to 
the working of the market should be by no means complete-
ly passive. In the first place government should continuously in-
vestigate the prices of major commodities to detect promptly cases 
in which they are being held substantially above competitive levels, 
through collusive practices or otherwise. Cotton cloth and vege-
table ghee seem, for example, to be good candidates for investiga-
tion. If existing laws do not enable the government to take 
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corrective action, these laws should be strengthened. 
In the second place, there are many cases which do not re-
quire direct controls but in which the impact of market forces 
can usefully be modified through the use of taxes and subsidies. 
Taxes and subsidies are frequently preferable to direct controls 
as an instrument to influence the uses to which existing resources 
are put, the structure of production and the dimension of new in-
vestment. To some extent these devices are already used for. this 
purpose as in the case of protective tariffs. Many of the present 
tax devices, however, are not well calculated to improve the use 
of resources* The tax concessions on new investment, even if original: 
justified, have become unnecessary and wasteful since new capital 
is already grossly underpriced and existing demands for capital 
equipment for repair and replacement, as well as for moderniza-
tion and expansion, cannot be fully satisfied. The present < 
sweeping concessions, instead of providing a needed stimulation 
to investment, merely augment this excess demand and provide an 
unnecessary windfall to the taxpayer. 
On the other side, the whole policy of taxation of exports 
should be carefully re-examined, both in general and for speci-
fic export products, in order to determine whether these taxes 
are not seriously interfering with the most productive use of the 
country's resources. The need for revenues is not a sufficient 
justification of cpntinuation of these taxes if their larger eco-
nomic effects are found to be adverse, since the revenue lost 
could be more than recovered by a new levy on imports, as is pro-
posed later in this memorandum. In considering the economic ef-
fects of export taxes, the main questions are the following: 
1. To what extent would the physical volume of exports be 
increased by removal of the tax? 
2. Would increased export volume be fully translated into 
foreign exchange earnings., or would much of the benefit 
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be wiped out by the depressing effect on world prices? 
(This question, which relates to the elasticity of 
world demand, arises chiefly in the case of jute.) 
3. Taking into account both the increased export volume 
and the possible adverse effect on world jute prices, 
would the net gain in foreign exchange earnings be suf-
ficient to compensate for the internal costs involved-
in additional production of goods for exports? In the 
case of cotton and jute, the chief element of internal 
costs would be the loss of other agricultural produc-
tion through diversion of acreage. Would the additional 
export earnings be more than sufficient to make good 
this loss of other agricultural output? 
4. Should the cotton textile and jute textile industries 
continue to be subsidized, or should they now be re-
quired to stand on their own feet without subsidy? If 5 
continued subsidy is deemed necessary, are export taxes 
which depress the internal prices of raw cotton and 
raw jute be the best means of subsidizing their manu-
factures? 
It is easier to raise these questions than to answer them, and 
even when further research has been carried out, difficult ques-
tions of judgement will still remain. The main point, however, is 
that a decision regarding these taxes should be based on full 
assessment of their economic effects rather than upon direct re.-
venue considerations. If the economic effect of a removal of 
some or all of these taxes would be to increase the overall pro-
ductivity, it should be possible to make good elsewhere the loss 
of revenue directly involved. 
Once this point is clearly recognized there are many opportu-
nities to use taxes instead of direct controls as a positive re-
gulatory device. For example, market demand for cigaretts appears 
to be high and growing. If the government feels that scarce capital, 
instead of being used to expand the capacity of this industry, 
should flow into other fields of greater social value, the tax on 
cigaretts could be increased to a point where demands for cigarettes 
is held within the limits of existing capacity. If, instead, new 
investment is merely curbed through denying import licenses, for 
the machinery while demand for cigarettes continues to grow, the 
price of cigaretts will rise and manufacturers and distributors 
will gain an unjustified windfall. This price increment might 
better be captured as taxes than be permitted to accrue as private 
profits. i\ price ceiling at the manufacturer's level cannot meet 
the problem, since it would merely transfer the distributors. If 
placed at the retail level, the ceiling would be widely evaded. 
Nor is rationing a workable solution for articles like cigarettes. 
Rationing, when administratively feasible, is probably the best 
course where essential consumer staples are in short supply, but 
should be limited to such goods. In other cases, the tax devise 
proposed above is greatly preferable. 
With respect to direct controls, import controls are the 
worst offenders of all. They are said to be justified on the ground 
that foreign exchange is short. But if foreign exchange ever 
reaches a condition of abundant supply, it will be a sign, among 
other things, that the development effort is grossly inadequate 
and that the country is not making full use of a key resource. 
Foreign exchange should be short. The fact of shortage, by itself, 
does not justify continuation of the present system, which mis-
uses resources and provides easy, monopoly profits to established, 
favoured firms and established industries. It favours proximity 
to Karachi. It greatly hampers small and medium sized firms and 
cottage industry. On the whole, it favours capital-intensive pro-
jects. It creates needless bottlenecks and waste of resources, 
owning to shortages of repair parts or key materials. It impedes 
the entry of new firm?, thereby stifling entrepreneurship res-
tricting competition and retarding industrial diversification. It 
provides easy profits to a favoured group. It deprives the go-
vernmentof such revenue which it could easily and properly obtain, 
although gradual strengthening of administration and the slow de-
velopment of more detailed statistical data might somewhat miti-
gate these shortcomings they are largely inherent in the system 
itself. 
Tha present dependence of direct controls of all sorts pre-
vents prices from fulfilling the regulatory role which they can 
perform. There is a widespread attitude in official quarters, 
that things should be kept cheap even when they are scarce. This 
attitude, which is justified in the case of basic necessities 
which can be rationed, causes needless difficulties in other 
areas. Since there is not enough to go around at the controlled chea 
price, the favoured firms or individuals, who are able to buy at 
the controlled price are able to enjoy a quite unjustified wind-
fall gain. In the case of scarce productive resources, the advan-
tage of allowing their prices to rise to a level which reflects 
their scarcity is that users generally will be induced to econo-
mize in their use, and generally speaking, only those who can make . 
the most profitable use of the scarce resources will buy them, 
although the most profitable uses are not invariably the most pro-
ductive uses, the criterion of profitability should be accepted in 
most fields. Under the present systems of low prices, those who 
are fortunate enough to receive the necessary permits often use 
the resources extravagantly, while others whose needs are, in many 
cases, of higher economic and social urgency are denied access to 
the supplies. The result can scarcely be called a system of private 
enterprise; it tends, rather, towards a restrictive type of state 
capitalism. 
There are many examples of this unwillingness to let prices 
perform their appropriate function. I am told, for example, that 
coal prices are equalized among the main consuming centers, so 
that prices in Lahore and Karachi, for example, are the same al-
though Lahore is closer to the source of supply. There is simply 
no reason for this. Rail haulage of coal is costly: it is capital-
intensive; railroad capacity is strained. I\ higher price for coal 
at Karachi, which would encourage the use of other fuels here 
and encourage industries using such coal to locate closer to the 
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supplies,.seems appropriate. It is also said that the price of 
Sui Gas; instead of being placed well below coal, has been fixed 
"competitively" with coal which has retarded substitution of the 
cheaper for the dearer fuel. I have'nt checked the accuracy of the 
foregoing statements on fuel prices, but I believe this sort of 
thing is widespread. 
The Planning Board has given much attention to the problem 
of over-centralization in public administration. The problem dis-
cussed above is a closely allied one. Under the system of direct 
controls, the function of decision-making in the private sector of 
the economy has been to a considerable extent transferred to go-
vernment. although decentralization of initiative, with coordina-
tion through market processes is perhaps the major advantage of a 
system of private enterprise, this advantage is now largely lost 
through the pervasiveness of official controls. The result is that 
the decision-making process for both the public and private sectors 
is characterized by government over-centralisation. Moreover, the 
application of the. separate controls is largely uncoordinated, 
with resulting large impairment of productivity through disturbances 
of economic balance. 
The Draft Plan stressed the general principle that national 
income could be raised not only by expanding total resources 
through new investment but, even more important, by using existing 
resources of higher levels of productivity. The Plan mentions 
several ways in which the use of existing resources can be im-
proved. In addition to the methods cited there, one should add an 
increased degree of reliance on the market mechanism, with reduced 
dependence on an uncoordinated use of centralized controls. 
In this connection the most important single step would be a 
substantial modification of the present system of import controls 
(while retaining present exchange regulations to prevent flight of 
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capital,, restrain vacation travel abroad and provide an additional 
check on luxury imports.) The change would consist of the impo-
sition of an import licence purchase roughly sufficient to elimi-
nate the present excess demand for imports. This level need not 
be accurately estimated in advance, since it can be found by suc-
cessive totals. I\ single rate of surcharge would apply to most im-
ported goods. a few goods, such as foodgrains and pharmaceuticals 
and necessary remittances to Pakistanis studying abroad might be 
exempted from surcharge, partly for social reasons; a few, such as 
private passenger cars and other imported luxuries, might be sub-
ject to a special penalty rate. With these exceptions, a uniform 
rate would apply. Generally speaking, differentials, in the levies 
on particular imports should continue to be confined to other 
rates of custom duties. 
an effort would- be made to fix the surcharges .at a level 
high enough to permit all remaining demand for import permits to 
be met except, perhaps, for luxury imports. There would be no need, 
however, for a precise balancing from day to day. The surcharges 
might be fixed at annual or semi-annual intervals,=and the foreign 
exchange reserves of the State Bank might serve, as at present, as 
a buffer stock to absorb surpluses or meet deficits. The surcharges 
should be paid not only by private importers but by government de-
partments. It is understood that the I.M.F. while opposing the 
auction system, does not look "with disfavour on a • system of the 
type proposed above and considers it in many respects preferable 
to the present type of licensing system which relies on official 
rationing rather than surcharges as a means of allocating scarce 
foreign exchange. 
This system possesses two basic advantages. In the first 
place, scarce foreign exchange would be put to more productive use 
than at present, access to import permits would be greatly broadened. 
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apart from importers, of luxury goods, who might be denied lican-
ses even if willing to pay the penalty surcharge, all those who 
were willing to pay the custom duties, sales tax and general 
surcharge would be granted licences to import. The decisions of 
buyers based upon their willingness or unwillingness to pay the 
surcharge would be substituted for the decisions of government 
officials in determining the allocation of scarce foreign exchange 
among competing claimants, although it cannot be held that those 
who are willing to pay the highest price will invariably be those 
who would put imported goods to their most productive uses, it 
is strongly probable that a much better result would be obtained 
than if the matter is left to government allotment, as an example, 
the benefits to cottage industry are readily apparent. Many such 
industries must have imported equipment in small amounts. Since 
the price of the equipment, even if high, is not a major element of 
cost, the price is usually of quite secondary importance to the 
prospective buyer. Many cottage industries today are fettered by 
their inability to get needed imports at any price. The same line 
of reasoning applies wholly or in part to many small-scale and 
medium-scale enterprises, to new firms and to business lacking 
representation in Karachi. The proposed liberalization of the im-
port licensing system would go far to remove this obstacle. It 
would by no means obviate the need for Cottage Industries Centres 
and other positive measures of stimulation, but it would make the 
task of stimulation much easier. Cottage industries, as well as 
small-scale or medium-scale industries which are now unable to . 
obtain licenses would benefit greatly. Since these industries are 
generally labour-intensive, the small amounts of capital equipment 
which they need would be very highly productive. 
at the other end of the scale, large established firms, un-
der the system now operating, are sometimes allotted much more 
foreign exchange than they would choose to acquire under the sur-
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charge system. The result has been that exchange has sometimes 
been used to purchase unnecessarily elaborate equipment and to 
set up industrial plants using ''advanced" technologies which are 
needlessly capital-intensive and therefore unsuitable here, .ilong 
the same lines, imported steel and other metals have been extra-
vagantly used in much construction work. Firms with large unin-
vested profits, when granted licenses, have purchased imports well 
beyond their requirements since they would rather hold imports 
than idle rupee balance. Although it might not be effective in all 
cases, the imposition of a high import license surcharge would 
tend to curb many of these low-priority uses of foreign exchange, 
thus freeing exchange for more productive purposes. It would also 
help to eliminate many crippling bottlenecks which now arise 
due to shortages of spare parts or key materials. 
The second major advantage of the system here proposed is 
that it would provide large government revenues which could be 
used for economic development. The producer of export crops receives 
a price in rupees which depends upon the official rates of ex- . 
change of which the foreign exchange proceeds of the exports are 
surrendered to the State Bank. If the producer of exports were 
allowed to sell the foreign exchange proceeds in a free market, in-
stead of at the official rate, his income would be greatly in-
creased. In effect, therefore, the requirement that the exporter 
surrender exchange at the official rate imposes a large, hidden 
levy on the producer of export goods. although a part of this 
levy is captured by the government through customs duties and 
sales taxes on imports, and through income and profits taxes, the 
maj^ r portion accrues as profits to private firms and individuals 
who sell industrial goods, imported or domestic, at the prevailing 
scarcity prices. Just as a levy is imposed upon the exporter who 
is required to sell foreign exchange at the official rates, a 
gift is bestowed upon the importer who receives a license and is 
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albwed to,acquire foreign exchange at these rates. For example, 
the manufacturer possessing an import license is permitted to buy 
his.capital equipment and raw materials with foreign currencies 
purchased at low official rates and to sell the resulting product 
at prices which fully reflect internal scarcities. Much of his pro-
fit emerges from the spread between world prices and internal 
prices. His gain is not essentially different from that of the 
importing merchant who merely resells at high internal prices the 
same goods he has been licensed to purchase abroad at much lower 
world market prices. 
Favoured access to cheap foreign exchange is one of the 
major sources of the large industrial and commercial profits of 
recent years. While continuation of the hidden levy on exports re-
presented by present exchange rates appears desirable unless a 
situation is reached where devaluation would substantially in-
crease foreign exchange savings, the proceeds should be collected 
and used by government for economic development. The levy becomes 
difficult to justify if it is chiefly transferred to private pro-
fits in the industrial and commercial sector. 
The internal price structure for industrial goods contrasts 
markedly with that for agricultural products. The effect of the 
official exchange rates and of export taxes on agricultural 
exports have been mentioned. In addition, governmental procure-
ment of foodgrains and other official measures have been used to 
hold down the prices paid to producers of domestically-consumed 
agricultural products. Consequently, the domestic terms of trade 
between the rural, agricultural sector and the commercial and 
industrial, urban sector are markedly unfavourable to agriculture 
and highly favourable to industry and commerce, in comparison 
with corresponding price ratios in the world market, although 
this is to some extent characteristic of underdeveloped, agricul-
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tural economies^ which export agricultural products and import ma-
nufactures , it is markedly accentuated in this country by govern-
ment policies. 
most 
These policies, although they bear/heavily on the poorer, 
backward sector for the benefit of the wealthier, developing 
sector should now be drastically reversed. In a predominantly ag-
ricultural country striving for economic development, a substan-
tial share of the internal resources needed for development uses 
must come, directly or indirectly, from agriculture. The question, 
therefore, is one of degree. It is not whether agriculture should 
bear such levies, both direct and disguised, but how large these 
levies should be. 
My answer would be that the direct levies, chiefly land re-
venue and water rates, are now too low, that the hidden levies 
probably are somewhat too high and that too large a share of the 
hidden levies is emerging as private industrial and commercial 
private 
profits rather than as public revenue. Such/profits, if predo-
minantly reinvested in high-priority fields, can contribute deci-
sively to economic development. This contribution was of first-
rate importance in stimulating and financing urgently needed in-
dustrial expansion in the initial phase of Pakistan's development. 
At present, however, these profits are not being so usefully em-
ployed. Top priority should today be given to agriculture rather 
than industry, and most of the high-priority investment needed at 
the present stage is public investment, A somewhat higher level of 
agricultural prices as a whole in relation to industrial prices 
would probably reinforce the effectiveness of the schemes for 
raising agricultural productivity although this cannot be stated 
with certainty. In any event, the growth of urban buying power 
may make it gradually more difficult to maintain present price re-
lationships, even if crop yields recover to normal levels. What-
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ever view may be taken on this question, it is clearly necessary 
that commercial profits be more heavily taxed in order that these 
funds may be funneled through the public sector into agricultural 
schemes and public investment projects which today deserve top 
priority. 2\n import surcharge appears to be the most effective, 
single measure for this purpose. 
Another serious case of underpricing of an acutely scarce 
resource is that of capital. Underpricing in this case results 
from a combination of direct and indirect causes. The direct 
causes are (1) the import licensing system, under which the price 
in rupees of imported equipment paid by firms granted licenses is 
held down; (2) low interest rates to these restricted classes of 
borrowers who can obtain funds through security floatations, bank 
credit, loans from insurance companies and similar sources and (3) 
substantial tax concessions on new investment. Thus, the business-
man who obtains an authorization to build or expand his plant, or 
import permit, and bank credit or permission to issue securities 
gains command over a scarce and highly profitable resource at ex-
tremely favourable terms. T\t these favourable terms, there exists 
today a sizeable, unsatisfied demand for import permits, for credit 
facilities and for other official authorizations. 
The general disadvantages of this system of under-pricing and 
official rationing have already been pointed out. Official res-
traints on certain types of profitable but undesirable investment, 
is 
wherever possible through taxation or if this/not possible by more 
direct means, should be continued and, in some.fields, strengthened 
government should encourage and promote private investment in 
other fields which, although potentially of high productivity, are 
held back by lack of entrepreneurship or special Obstacles. But 
the present attempt at private regulation of the whole field of 
new investment results in wasteful and distorted use of resources. 
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Although the market mechanism does not yield ideal results, the 
results, apart from special cases, are likely to be much better 
than under the present system of pervasive regulation. 
Revision of the present import licensing system has been pro-
posed above. The draft Plan contains proposals for controlling 
present tax concessions on new investment. There remains the prob-
lem of broadening credit facilities and the closely related prob-
lem of interest rates. The rates paid on government loans and 
loans to first class private borrowers are at a level with or 
below those now prevailing in most advanced countries. The volume 
of funds which can be made available for lending without produc-
ing dangerous inflation is narrowly limited, however. Under pre-
sent conditions, financial facilities are inadequate and loan-
able funds are available to only a few, restricted classes of 
borrowers, so that most of the productive demand for funds from 
credit-worthy borrowers remains unsatisfied. Thus, low interest 
rates go hand in hand with a restrictive rationing of financing 
facilities, partly through government action and partly through the 
narrowly restrictive lending practices of the banks. 
The draft Plan contains recommendations for a comprehensive 
broadening of credit facilities to both industry and agriculture. 
As this is achieved the total demand for loans would greatly ex-
ceed the amounts which could be made available without leading to 
serious inflation, an obvious solution would be to pErmit interest 
rates to rise in order to discourage marginal borrowers and limit 
demand to those productive borrowers whose uses for funds promised 
sufficiently high returns to enable them to meet the higher in-
terest costs. High interest rates, besides channeling funds into 
uses promising the highest returns, migh': also be conducive to 
increased thrift. 
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Since high interest rates are generally deemed objection-
able on religious and moral grounds, this method of meeting the 
problem probably must be rejected, an alternative approace, which, 
although providing no inducement to increased thrift, would be 
as effective as higher interest rates in making it possible to 
broaden the availability of credit to borrowers who at present 
cannot obtain funds at any price would be to impose an annual 
tax on a borrower's average outstanding indebtedness above a 
stated minimum figure. The annual carrying charge on a loan would 
then consist of the interest paid to the lender plus the tax paid 
to the government. The exemption limit should be placed high 
enough (1) to exempt the borrowing of -small and medium sized cul-
tivators ; and individuals borrowing small amounts to meet tempo-
rary personal needs and (2) to keep down the costs of collection 
by excluding a large number of small assessments. Enforcement of 
the tax would be aided by utilizing the loan records of banks, 
insurance companies and other major lending agencies. In ex-
plaining the tax to the public, it would be justified both as a 
measure for capturing the windfall profits which some businesses 
get through low interest rates and as a measure which must go 
hand in hand with the broadening of credit facilities in order 
to avoid the dangers which a marked broadening of credit faci-
lities would otherwise involve. The tax might perhaps be waived 
on a highly selective basis, for a few new industries deserving 
of high-priority and needing special inducements to expand. 
Tin increased measure of reliance on the price mechanism is 
the unifying trend linking the proposals in this memorandum. 
They run counter to much accepted practice in the sub-continent 
and will doubtless be resisted for this reason among others. I 
suspect, however, that in actual practice, India has moved a 
considerable distance in recent years towards freeing private 
industry from a network of official controls, while controls here 
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have increased* although the ideology of Pakistan is rather 
friendly, and that of India rather unfriendly, to private busi-
ness, the actual scope for private initiative may well be broader 
in India than in Pakistan. 
The proposals in this memorandum may be objected to on the 
ground that by reducing profits, they will restrict private bu-
siness. While it is true that private enterprise responds to the 
incentive of profit, it by no means follows that greater profit 
always invokes greater enterprise. When easy profits for a few 
are the result of government policies which exclude other poten-
tial bidders for resources, they are a deterrent to enterprise. 
The present situation in Pakistan appears somewhat analo-
gousto' that which prevailed in Western Europe in the late mercan-
tile period. In the" preceding stage of European development the 
grant of subsidies and monopoly privileges to selected commercial 
interest appears to have provided a powerful stimulus to commer-
cial expansion. By the 18th century, however, these traditional 
devices obstructed development by favouring a few, long-established 
and strongly entrenched interests and handicapping new enterprises 
and new activities, although in Pakistan there are many, specific 
fields which still require government assistance, the economy has 
reached a stage where the present pervasive system of controls 
exerts a similar restraining effect. 
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